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The current revival of interest in the common good is exciting, and not just because it has the 
potential to change the way we do politics. It also provokes us to reflect upon the sort of society we 
have and the kind of society we would like. 
We are not in the habit of reflecting in this way. There have been moments when we have endorsed 
new political platforms at the ballot box, but we do not routinely engage in reflection upon the 
purpose of our corporate life together and the values and principles upon which that life is built.1 
Perhaps in this we fall foul, collectively, of the judgment Socrates made about individuals who leave 
their lives ‘unexamined’. 
The process leading to the referendum on devolution in Scotland in 2014, however, demonstrated 
that, when people do have the opportunity to decide the kind of country they wish to live in, they 
have both the inclination and capacity to engage in robust and informed debate. Participation in that 
referendum was, at 85%, higher than for any UK election in living memory,2 suggesting that, when 
profound political change, beyond an agenda set by mainstream political parties, is at stake, people 
have an appetite for democratic engagement in its fullest sense. 
                                                          
1 Perhaps the last example of a ‘national conversation’ about how our polity operates, and in whose interests, 
was the so-called Putney Debates in 1647. 
2 www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2012/nov/16/uk-election-turnouts-historic [accessed 28 September 
2014]. 
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Embracing the common good also impels us to move beyond the party political agenda to consider 
the kind of society we wish to live in. Placing both human dignity and human community at the 
centre of political and economic decision-making, the common good challenges us to consider the 
extent to which we live in solidarity with each other, recognize our interdependence, and seek the 
wellbeing of all. 
More positively, it dares us to come together to find ways in which we can forge a fairer and more 
equal society, one in which all can enjoy fulfilment in the economic, political and cultural life of that 
society. As Catholic Social Teaching, one of its main wellsprings, asserts, ‘the common good is the 
reason that the political authority exists’.3 Thus it pushes us to think beyond our traditional 
understanding of democracy, with its emphasis on periodic elections involving parties promoting 
sectional interests, towards the question of what ‘politics’ is for and how it can fulfil its raison d’être, 
the welfare of the people for whom it has been created. It also takes us beyond a ‘right/left’ 
polarisation of politics, seeing neither greater power for the state, nor greater freedom for the market, 
as necessarily the key to improving human wellbeing: factors such as a renewing and reinvigorating 
of civil society will also be involved. Pursuing the common good is about recovering hope, vision 
and purpose, or, in Christian terms, discovering how all can know the ‘life in all its fullness’ which 
Jesus placed at the heart of his mission (John 10.10). 
 
Public reasoning 
Both Amartya Sen4 and Michael Sandel5 have argued that public reasoning, more than elections, 
defines what democracy is about. South African theologian John de Gruchy sees democracy both ‘as 
                                                          
3 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (Vatican City: 
Liberia Editrice Vaticana, 2004), #168, 95. 
4 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (London: Penguin, 2010) 321-37. 
5 Michael Sandel, Justice: What’s the right thing to do? (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), chapter 
10. 
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a vision of what society should become and… as a system of government that seeks to enable the 
realization of that vision within particular contexts.’6 We need to encourage and embrace the public 
reasoning and envisioning of which these writers speak if we wish to forge an alternative to our 
current politics, in which sections of society, divided by competing interests, press their disparate 
concerns on a state which has no core of shared values to draw upon in order to adjudicate on these 
disputes.7 But how, concretely, might we develop a public conversation about the ‘good life’ in a 
society characterised by ideological, religious and moral plurality? 
On the one hand it will be argued that, in a pluralist society, no one particular set of beliefs should be 
allowed to prevail over others, nor should the state be seen to endorse one conception of the good 
society over others. Yet the very point about the common good is that it is not imposed from outside 
(or above) but emerges from open, inclusive discussion committed to exploring competing 
convictions regarding in what it might consist. It serves precisely, as Michael Sandel says, to 
generate ‘a more robust public engagement with our moral disagreements’.8 To seek the common 
good is to take pluralism and social difference more seriously than does conventional politics, since, 
as Anna Rowlands asserts, it involves addressing these challenges by promoting a more deliberative 
and participatory politics.9 No society will ever agree conclusively regarding in what ‘the good life’ 
fully consists but, as Alain de Botton has argued, this ‘should not in itself be enough to disqualify us 
from investigating and promoting the theoretical notion of such a life.’10 
 
Social justice 
                                                          
6 Cited in Richard Harries, Faith in Politics? Rediscovering the Christian Roots of our Political Values 
(London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2010), 64 (emphasis in original). 
7 See Paul Vallely, ‘Towards a New Politics: Catholic Social Teaching in a Pluralist Society’ in Vallely, ed, The 
New Politics: Catholic Social Teaching for the Twenty-First Century (London: SCM, 1998) 154. 
8 Michael Sandel, Justice, 268. Cf. Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine 
of the Church, #170, 96. 
9 Anna Rowlands, ‘Faith in the Common Good’, unpublished briefing paper, 9 June 2014. 
10 Alain de Botton, Religion for Atheists: A non-believer’s guide to the uses of religion (London: Hamish Hamilton, 
2012) 83. 
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I want to pursue a way forward suggested by Raymond Plant in his essay, Politics, Theology and 
History. Recognizing the potential pitfalls in promoting discussion specifically about ‘the common 
good’, Plant proposes a focus on ‘social justice’, a search for those ‘common needs or basic goods 
which people have to have in order to… pursue any conception of the good whatever it might be.’11 
Such an approach, Plant suggests, addresses the question of how a shared vision of society – such as 
is implied by the common good – might be pursued in a pluralist society. Plant is clear that 
to argue that the common good can consist in a rich, deep and elaborated form of substantive 
agreement on values and human purposes… looks both implausible and potentially dangerous 
in a society marked by moral diversity in which individuals believe strongly that judgments 
about substantive and, indeed, ultimate values are for them to make by exercising their own 
judgment.12 
Promoting debate on ‘social justice’, however, renders the task of pursuing the common good less a 
search for some kind of ‘substantive common purpose’ or ‘transcendent moral order’ than an attempt 
to identify 
the range of goods and services, benefits and opportunities which all citizens need to have in 
order to pursue their conception of the good, whatever it might turn out to be.13 
There will still be groundwork to do, given liberalism’s antipathy to the merits of social justice. For 
Friedrich Hayek and the neo-liberal economic school, it is fundamentally not the responsibility of the 
state to tinker with the outcomes of a market system in which everyone is freely allowed the 
opportunity to buy and sell. If some people find themselves without the essentials of life, that is 
simply a consequence of the various transactions that take place within the market and cannot be 
                                                          
11 Raymond Plant, Politics, Theology and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 198. 
12 Plant, Politics, Theology and History, 196-7. 
13 Plant, Politics, Theology and History, 198. 
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considered unjust unless such transactions are coerced. Thus, for neo-liberals, the appropriate 
response is charity, not state redistribution, and the purpose of a welfare state to prevent destitution, 
not rectify inequality. Hayek famously dismissed social justice as a ‘mirage’.14 
At the other end of the liberal spectrum will be those for whom responsibility for the administration 
of social justice must lie with the state. But while the state could have a role in the quest to satisfy 
basic needs, over-reliance on it can serve to weaken, de-skill and disempower communities as well as 
generate dependency. ‘Redistribution without reciprocity’, as Maurice Glasman has written, can 
‘leave its recipients untransformed’: ‘the state can undermine responsibility, agency and 
participation.’15 
The idea that even a minimal shared understanding of ‘social justice’ may be attainable is also 
rejected by the philosophically liberal view, articulated most cogently by John Rawls.16 For Rawls, it 
is essential that governments in liberal democratic societies do not espouse one normative concept of 
‘the good’, only that they provide adequate procedures to enable each member to choose from a 
range of ‘goods’ and debate their relative value. A government promoting one particular notion of 
‘the good life’ risks imposing on everyone values espoused only by some. It fails to respect people’s 
ability and right to choose their ends for themselves. 
Yet as we have already noted, by definition the common good is not something ‘imposed’ from 
above: rather it emerges from open, mature discussion. In any case, as Sandel argues, an individual’s 
deliberation about their own ‘good’ cannot but involve reflection on the good of the community to 
which he or she is bound. It is mistaken to think that one can remain neutral regarding the values 
                                                          
14 F. A. Hayek, The Mirage of Social Justice (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976). See also Plant, 
Politics, Theology and History, 203. 
15 Maurice Glasman, ‘The Good Society and the Politics of the Common Good’, lecture given at the Centre for 
Social Justice, 11 February 2014, http://centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/UserStorage/pdf/Events/Glasman-
speech.pdf [accessed 19 March 2014]. 
16 See for example, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971) and Political 
Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 
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upon which a society is grounded, or the ends to which it should be directed: ‘it may not be possible, 
or even desirable, to deliberate about justice without deliberating about the good life.’17 
For Sandel, achieving a just society involves more than securing individual ‘freedom of choice’: we 
have also ‘to reason together about the meaning of the good life, and to create a public culture 
hospitable to the disagreements that will inevitably arise.’18 John Finnis also wants to go beyond 
Rawls in arguing that the pursuit of the common good and justice requires more than the 
establishment of certain procedural rules which ensure individual liberty or fair play. For Finnis the 
community needs to operate together to 
secure the whole ensemble of material and other conditions, including forms of collaboration, 
that tend to favour, facilitate and foster the realization by each individual of his or her 
personal development.19 
In the light of this I want to suggest that it is possible to conceive of a debate about the merit and 
meaning of social justice, addressing the question: 
do we, as a society, agree that we have a responsibility toward those among us who lack the 
means to pursue their conception of the good life, and commit ourselves, with the practical 
support of government, to work to ensure that that lack is remedied; or do we consider that, 
both in principle and practice, pursuing social justice is wrong and that, so long as 
individuals are free to pursue their own lifestyle and subjective preferences, government has 
no responsibility other than to ensure that that freedom is maintained? 
Such a debate would not only deepen our political discourse, moving us from a focus on individual 
material wellbeing toward what best serves the ‘common weal’, it would provoke critical thinking 
                                                          
17 Sandel, Justice, 242. 
18 Sandel, Justice, 261. 
19 Cited in Nicholas Sagovsky, Christian Tradition and the Practice of Justice (London: SPCK, 2008) 173. 
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about the operation of the market and the question whether it should work to promote the wellbeing 
of all. I want to consider each in turn. 
 
Politics 
Pat Logan has highlighted the potential of the common good to change the nature of political 
discourse within democratic societies. ‘A notion of the common good’, Logan writes,  
gives us a language which can take us beyond the notion of politics as simple bargaining, 
where one group’s rights and interests are played off against another’s, to mature political 
argument, where communication and a common search for good can be pursued.20 
Michael Sandel also wants a renewing of political discourse towards ‘a politics of moral 
engagement’,21 noting that in order for this to happen there needs to be a re-orientation among 
citizens, away from a focus on purely individual concerns toward the importance of building a 
common life together. ‘If a just society requires a strong sense of community’, Sandel writes, 
it must find a way to cultivate in citizens a concern for the whole, a dedication to the common 
good. It can’t be indifferent to the attitudes and dispositions, the ‘habits of the heart’, that 
citizens bring to public life. It must find a way to lean against purely privatized notions of the 
good life, and cultivate civic virtue.22 
Oliver O’Donovan is also worried that what inspires people to political action is less a concern about 
wider social issues than the defence of their private or sectional interests;23 and if, like Sandel, he 
does not explicitly use the language of ‘conversion’ when considering how a shift to concern for the 
common interest might be achieved, Clifford Longley does refer to the involvement of the conscience 
                                                          
20 Pat Logan, A World Transformed; When hopes collapse and faiths collide (London: CTBI, 2007), 125. 
21 Sandel, Justice, 269. 
22 Sandel, Justice, 263-4. 
23 Oliver O’Donovan, The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the roots of political theology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996) 271; cf. Vallely, Towards a New Politics, 151. 
8 
 
in embracing the common good and the need for a ‘moment of metanoia when the truth really strikes 
home that “we are all responsible for all”’.24 
What this metanoia involves, as the papal encyclical Sollicitudo rei socialis implies, is a shift, when 
confronting social issues, from harbouring feelings of pity or a concern to make a practical response, 
to a recognition of our ‘solidarity’ and ‘interdependence’ one with another. The response to social 
problems should not be ‘a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress’ at others’ misfortunes, 
rather 
a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good; that is to say, to 
the good of all and of each individual because we are all really responsible for all.25 
As the US activist and writer Jim Wallis likes to put it, the change we need is that which moves us 
beyond wanting to keep up with the Joneses to making sure the Joneses are okay!26 I shall return to 
how this change might be encouraged later. 
 
The Economy 
A debate on the common good will provoke reflection about the operation of the market and the role 
of government, challenging those who hold polarised positions with respect to both to think in new 
paradigms. It will prompt us to move beyond wanting to see excessive power invested in either the 
market or the state, recognising that both should work together to promote the wellbeing of all. While 
the market will need maximum freedom if it is to enable, in the words of the Vatican II document 
Gaudium et Spes, ‘people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfilment more fully and 
                                                          
24 Clifford Longley, ‘Government and the common good’ in Nick Spencer & Jonathan Chaplin, eds, God and 
Government (London: SPCK, 2009), 163. 
25 Sollicitudo rei socialis, Encyclical Letter of Pope John Paul II (1987) #38.4 
26 Jim Wallis, Rediscovering Values: On Wall Street, Main Street, and Your Street (New York: Howard Books, 
2010) fly-leaf. 
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more easily’,27 common good considerations bring us back to the question of social justice by asking 
whether it is meaningful to talk about people having the ‘freedom’ to pursue their conception of ‘the 
good’ if they lack the basic necessities to be able to do it. 
Engaging with the common good, then, prompts questions about the very purpose and end of market 
activity. As the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales noted in their document on the 
common good issued prior to the 1997 general election, ‘market forces, when properly regulated in 
the name of the common good, can be an efficient mechanism for matching resources to needs in a 
developed society’. No other system is superior in terms of encouraging wealth creation, advancing 
prosperity and enabling poverty to be relieved. But when the economy itself becomes the end rather 
than the means, when the distinction between the market as a ‘technical economic method’ and ‘a 
total ideology or world view’ is blurred, individual rather than common interest may prevail. As the 
bishops put it, 
an economic creed that insists the greater good of society is best served by each individual 
pursuing his or her own self-interest is likely to find itself encouraging individual selfishness, 
for the sake of the economy... A wealthy society, if it is a greedy society, is not a good 
society.28 
Other commentators on the common good reflect the bishops’ concerns regarding the potential of 
free market economic theory to claim more for itself than is warranted: for Nick Townsend, 
business activity should never be subjected to an overriding imperative of maximizing profit. 
Rather, it can and should be a hard-headed form of love of neighbour, in which the end is to 
supply goods and services – things that are good for and of service to people – and the wholly 
necessary means is making a profit. 
                                                          
27 Gaudium et spes (1965), #26. 
28 Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales, The Common Good and the Catholic Church’s Social 
Teaching, (London: 1996) #78-80, 19. 
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‘In neoliberal capitalism’, Townsend concludes, ‘ends and means have been mistaken for each 
other.’29 John Gray also notes how market freedoms should only be a means to an end, that end being 
individual well-being.30 Indeed, for Clifford Longley it is on account of its identifying a distinction 
between the market as a tool and as an ideology ‘that Catholic Social Teaching has an important 
contribution to make to current thinking on how to make contemporary capitalism a gentler beast.’31 
Here we return to the suggestion that ‘social justice’ serve as a starting point for a conversation about 
the common good. If the minimum demand of a social justice agenda is that all citizens have the 
basic goods, services and opportunities they need in order to pursue their conception of the good, this 
challenges us explicitly to confront the question of the ‘means’ and ‘ends’ of market activity. Is our 
concept of ‘justice’ one which demands that no one should be excluded from having a stake in 
society, including those who are most marginalized, regardless of how they came to be in that 
situation? And does that lead us to want to argue that the market should be open to that degree of 
manipulation necessary in order for it to meet that end? Or do we consider the goal of the market 
simply to be its freedom to operate in a wholly unfettered manner, viewing its outcomes not as 
matters of justice or injustice but the necessary consequences of a morally neutral process? 
At present we take it to be the duty of government to create and sustain the conditions under which 
we, as citizens, are free to produce and consume as we wish. Our notion of the ‘good society’, albeit 
that it may be implicit, is one in which maximum individual freedom is guaranteed and government, 
taking note of the demands we citizens express, enables those demands to be satisfied with minimal 
interference. Recovering the common good brings into view another vision of society, one in which 
                                                          
29 Nicholas Townsend, ‘Government and social infrastructure’ in Spencer & Chaplin, eds, God and 
Government, 126. 
30 Cited in Vallely, ‘Towards a new Politics’, 151. 
31 Clifford Longley, ‘Structures of Sin and the Free Market: John Paul II on Capitalism’, in Vallely, ed, The New 
Politics, 107. 
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we also take into account those shared moral obligations which make up the bonds of community and 
which government must also protect. 
To the liberal economist, the unfettered operation of the market is precisely the way to satisfy the 
demands of the common good, to enable each person to reach their fulfilment more fully and more 
easily. Yet we still have the issue of those who, for whatever reason, do not or cannot reach their 
fulfilment. Can we meaningfully talk about people being ‘free’ to pursue their conception of the 
‘good life’ if they lack the basic necessities needed in order to be able to do it. As Plant has argued, 
If the state is seen as a guarantor of freedom for individuals, then it would be part of the 
responsibility of the state to secure to individuals the resources and opportunities they need to 
be able to do what they are free to do.32 
Among these might be health, education and a degree of financial security.  
For Michael Sandel the growing gap between rich and poor is a further theme which ‘a new politics 
of the common good’ should address, undermining as it does the ‘solidarity that democratic 
citizenship requires’.33 Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett have identified the adverse social 
outcomes found in societies characterised by a high degree of inequality,34 and Sandel also notes 
what he calls the ‘fiscal’ and ‘civic’ social effects of deepening inequality: ‘fiscal’ in the sense that, 
as the rich live ever more separate lives and withdraw from public places and services, so they 
become unwilling to support them through their taxes, and their quality deteriorates; and ‘civic’ in 
the sense that what were once public spaces cease to be places where citizens from different walks of 
life encounter one another. ‘The hollowing out of the public realm’, Sandel concludes, ‘makes it 
difficult to cultivate the solidarity and sense of community on which democratic community 
                                                          
32 Plant, Politics, Theology and History, 206. 
33 Sandel, Justice, 263, 266. 
34 See in particular Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, The Spirit Level: Why more equal societies almost 
always do better (London: Penguin, 2009), and the website of the Equality Trust: www.equalitytrust.org.uk. 
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depends.’35 A common good approach would seek to engage all sections of society in debating this 
issue, exploring questions such as the extent to which narrowing the inequality gap would be in the 
interest of all, and whether public institutions and services might be rebuilt so that rich and poor alike 
would want to take advantage of them.  
 
Government 
Economic reforms of this kind raise the question of the role of government in promoting the common 
good. Clearly government would play a part in any drive to reduce inequality, but common good 
teaching challenges more broadly the notion that (in Catholic Social Teaching terminology), ‘the 
right ordering of economic life’ can ‘be left to a free competition of forces.’36 Indeed, Catholic 
teaching argues that, while all members of society have a role, according to their capacity, in 
attaining and developing the common good, ‘the State’ has the responsibility for attaining it ‘since 
the common good is the reason that the political authority exists.’37 
Catholic teaching thus poses a challenge to the current orthodoxy that, left to its own operations, the 
market can meet the needs and wants of individuals and society. In a document issued following the 
demise of Communism in 1989, John Paul II warned against embracing a free-market capitalism ‘not 
circumscribed within a strong juridical framework which places it at the service of human freedom in 
its totality’. For the Pope, neither unrestricted capitalism nor ‘the socialist system’ was compatible 
with a ‘society of free work, of enterprise and of participation’; for while such a society would not be 
‘directed against the market’, it would demand 
that the market be appropriately controlled by the forces of society and by the state, so as to 
guarantee that the basis needs of the whole of society are satisfied.38 
                                                          
35 See Sandel, Justice, 266-7. 
36 Quadragesimo Anno, Encyclical Letter of Pope Pius XI (1931) #88. 
37 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, #167-8, 94-5. 
38 Centesimus Annus, Encyclical Letter of Pope John Paul II (1991) #35. 
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A ‘common good’ perspective on the market prompts a number of questions for us today, including 
whether policy decisions must always be considered first in terms of their economic implications, or 
whether factors such as the extent to which they are ‘right’ or ‘just’ be given more consideration; 
might, in other words, seeking the common good lead us at times to agree on a course of action 
because it is for the good of all before agreeing how it will be realized? 
A common good orientation would also challenge us to ask whether growth in GDP is necessarily the 
best indicator of our collective health and wellbeing, or whether that might be dependent upon other 
factors; to think afresh about our responsibility to those beyond our immediate community, including 
those not yet born, in the light of what we know about climate change and the imperative to adopt 
more sustainable lifestyles and business practices; and to reflect upon whether the marketization of 
services is always the right course, or whether some should still remain ‘services’, paid for from the 
public purse? Importantly, it would also challenge the fundamental liberal assumption that our 
motive for engaging in market activity is primarily to acquire personal wealth and comfort, that we 
do not also have the capacity to be concerned for ‘the other’ and the well-being of wider society. 
 
Subsidiarity 
If pursuing the common good requires that governments be open to the possibility of acting, on our 
behalf, to ensure that the market works for specific ends which we agree are socially desirable, this is 
not to say that it envisages the return of big government: as noted earlier, it is the responsibility of all 
members of society to promote and work for the common good, not simply politicians and 
government officials. The common good flourishes primarily at the grassroots. Often spoken of in the 
same breath as the common good is the concept of ‘subsidiarity’, another core feature of Catholic 
Social Teaching, which specifically rejects the notion that governments arrogate power to 
themselves: indeed, stressing the importance of community initiative, mutual co-operation and de-
14 
 
centralization, subsidiarity asks of the state that it only undertake those activities which exceed the 
capacity of individuals or private groups acting independently. ‘As much freedom as possible, as 
much intervention as necessary’ describes the ideal relationship between government and local 
communities in the search for the common good.39 
Subsidiarity and the common good should be seen as complementary rather than standing in isolation 
to one another. Thus for example, while subsidiarity requires schools, hospitals and the police to be 
administered as low-down the chain of decision-making as possible, it does not require such services 
to be privatized. As Clifford Longley has put it, 
to insist on the withdrawal of ‘the state’ from health, education or welfare provision, as some 
of the more extreme proponents of subsidiarity advocate, is not a true application of the 
principle because it could easily undermine, rather than promote, the common good.40 
 
Conclusion 
The common good challenges us to address the fundamental, and essentially religious, question of 
what it means to be human. It asks whether we primarily see ourselves as autonomous individuals, 
whose goal as a society extends only as far as realizing individual potential, individual goals and 
individual freedom, free from any responsibility to seek a common purpose or care for those unable 
to realize these individual goals? Or whether we believe that our humanity is constituted most 
profoundly by our relationships, such that our personal wellbeing includes reference to the fact of our 
sharing a common life together. 
These are questions we need to discuss in order to encounter the central truth to which the common 
good attests, that we only fully flourish as individuals when those around us flourish too. Of course, 
                                                          
39 New Zealand Church Leaders, Social Justice Statement, 1993, #28: www.justice.net.nz/justwiki/social-
justice-statement-1993 [accessed 5 March 2013]. 
40 Longley, ‘Government and the common good’, 167-8. 
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the conversation is alive in many quarters, but the challenges involved in developing it are great, 
which is why the language of ‘conversion’ is appropriate. We noted earlier Sandel’s assertion that 
creating a just society involves changing ‘the habits of the heart’ and ‘leaning against purely 
privatized notions of the good life’, albeit that self-interest (in the sense that my individual 
flourishing depends on the flourishing of all) may inspire action for the common good no less than 
pure altruism. 
Participation in projects seeking to actualize the common good is one way in which its benefits can 
be realized by all. If the common good is rooted in ‘the local’, then it is through experiencing the 
difference it can make at grassroots that we can begin to embrace it as a mode of politics. From 
schoolchildren identifying issues of concern in their local neighbourhood and preparing cost-effective 
and creative solutions for submission to their local authority,41 to people with divergent perspectives 
and interests on specific topics coming together to listen, dialogue and generate new and mutually 
beneficial ideas for action,42 the common good can prove its value as a new kind of conversation that 
goes beyond old divisions – left and right, business and unions, secular and faith, local and national – 
to create new and hopeful possibilities. 
An important catalyst for common good activity can be the church, which has nurtured the concept of 
the common good and is at the centre of many communities promoting civic action and building 
relationships across divides. The Christian faith can also provide, for some, a ‘foundational narrative’ 
or ‘reason’ for a society ordered around mutuality rather than individualism, that of human beings 
made in the image of a Trinitarian God whose very essence is relational and interdependent.43 
                                                          
41 Lyn Campbell QSM, ‘Where does social justice start?’ in Ruth Porter, ed, Pursuing Social Justice in New 
Zealand (Auckland: Maxim Institute, 2007) 16. 
42 Such dialogues have been promoted by ‘Together for the Common Good’ – 
www.togetherforthecommongood.co.uk. 
43 Cf. Tim Gibson, ‘Spirituality and the countryside: a rural perspective on Christian formation and the Big 
Society’ in Alan Smith and Jill Hopkinson, eds, Faith and the Future of the Countryside: Pastoral and 
theological perspectives on rural sustainability (London: Canterbury Press Norwich, 2012) 204-6; Anna 
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If the Catholic catechism is right that 
a society that wishes and intends to remain at the service of the human being at every level is 
a society that has the common good – the good of all people and of the whole person – as its 
primary goal44 
we need urgently to develop a public conversation about how such a society might be achieved. 
 
I would like to acknowledge the help of Jenny Sinclair, Jonathan Chaplin and Maria Power, who 
read and commented on drafts of this chapter. 
                                                          
Rowlands, keynote lecture at the Together for the Common Good conference, Liverpool, September 2013, 
http://togetherforthecommongood.co.uk/viewpoints/opinion-pieces/articles/anna-rowlands.html [accessed 19 
March 2014]. 
44 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, #165, 93. 
